Reconsidering sensory evidence in Nłeʔkepmxcín*

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Nłeʔkepmxcín (Thompson River Salish), a Northern Interior Salishan language of British Columbia, has traditionally been classified as having a three-way evidential contrast between non-visual evidence (*nuk*^{w}), reportative evidence (*ek*^{w}*u*), and inferential evidence (*nke*). In investigating the contexts in which these particles are used, however, we find that *nuk*^{w} shows rather different semantic and pragmatic properties than do the other Nłeʔkepmxcín evidentials or evidentials in other languages. We propose that *nuk*^{w} acts rather more like an "expressive" particle (Kaplan, 1999; Potts, 2005; Schlenker, 2007), and that the category of Evidentials may include a more diverse set of meanings than traditionally considered.

1 Introduction

Nłeʔkepmxcín (Thompson River Salish) and the other Salishan languages exhibit a rich system of "second-position" particles – small words that occur directly after the first word in a clause and typically are pronounced as part of the previous word (Thompson and Thompson, 1992). These particles serve a wide variety of functions: grammatical person markers, modals, emphatic particles, question particles, and many particles whose contribution to the meaning of the sentence is unclear. Indeed, speakers note that, although their use is essential to fluent speech, it is very difficult to provide English definitions or equivalents for them (Patricia McKay, p.c.).

To this end, we have been attempting to catalogue the second-position particles of Nłeʔkepmxcín, noting the various contexts in which they are used, in hopes of discovering each particle's *use conditions*. Following up on an observation by Kaplan (1999), for many words (*cow, dance, transubstantiation*) we can provide definitions, or point to examples of them, but for many other words (*ouch, oops, alas*) it would be difficult or impossible to define them or point to what they refer to. For these words, describing their "meaning" is equivalent to describing the conditions under which they are used.

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> "I don't ask 'what does *goodbye* mean?'". Instead I ask, 'what are the conditions under which the expression would be correctly or accurately used?'. This seems like a much more fruitful line of inquiry for words like *goodbye*" (Kaplan, 1999).

We have been taking this approach in investigating some of Nłeʔkepmxcín's more "untranslatable" particles, and in doing so have found an interesting phenomenon among the evidential particles: one of them (*nuk*^{w}) behaves quite unlike the other Nłeʔkepmxcín evidentials, and unlike evidentials in other languages as well. We propose that rather than contribute a prototypically evidential meaning – that is, adding to an utterance a meaning that that information is known by particular means – it primarily contributes an *expressive* meaning (Kaplan, 1999; Potts, 2005), expressing that the speaker is at the moment in a particular state.

Specifically, we propose that it expresses that the speaker is in a state of having been affected by a stimulus. This use condition is, admittedly, extremely broad, but so are the situations in which *nuk*^{w} appears. Indeed, its use goes far beyond contexts of non-visual evidence, comprising nearly any context in which expressive content is appropriate.

This proposal can be situated as part of a larger debate regarding evidentiality and its implementation in formal semantics (Waldie et al., 2009; Matthewson, 2011). This debate centers around what formal apparatus best captures the semantic and pragmatic properties of evidentials: are they modals (Izvorski, 1997; Matthewson et al., 2007; McCready and Ogata, 2007), speech-act operators (Faller, 2002; Portner, 2006), or some other sort of semantic object (Chung, 2007; Murray, 2010)? We seek to contribute to this debate by suggesting that there can also be *expressive* evidentials.

2 Evidentiality in Nłeʔkepmxcín

"Evidentiality" is commonly defined as the grammatical marking of information source (Aikhenvald, 2004). In many languages, speakers can (and sometimes must) make clear, for each assertion, how they gained the information: whether it was (for example) by direct witness, by hearsay, by pure conjecture, etc. In Nłeʔkepmxcín, evidentiality is marked by the addition of particular second-position particles to a sentence.

In Thompson and Thompson's (1992) grammar of Nłeʔkepmxcín, three second-position particles are described as signaling "evidential" meanings: *nuk*^{w} for non-visual evidence, *ek*^{w}*u* for reportative evidence, and *nke* for inferential evidence. Nłeʔkepmxcín therefore exhibits a "B4" evidential system in Aikhenvald's (2004) evidential typology. Direct visual evidence is not morphologically marked, and evidential marking does not appear to be obligatory.[1]

[1] Although evidential marking is not obligatory for the grammaticality of the sentence, speakers note that it is nonetheless necessary for proper communication; misuse of them can be pragmatically or socially inappropriate (Mandy Jimmie, p.c.).

2.1 *nuk^{w}*: non-visual evidence

nuk^{w} is used in situations where the speaker has witnessed the event or state in question, but not visually – they have felt it, or heard it, or smelled or tasted it.

(1) ċalt-ẇiy nuk^{w} xeʔ e sqyeytn
salty-very SENSE DEM DET fish
'That fish tastes very/too salty.'

It is not in general used to mark knowledge known by direct visual witness, although as we will show below there are systematic exceptions to this. Nonetheless, plain statements of visual fact are almost never marked with *nuk^{w}*, and attempts at inserting it are rejected.

(2) ʔes-k^{w}eli̇ʔ (*nuk^{w}) xeʔ tek n=ƛ̓piċeʔ
STAT-green (SENSE) DEM OBL 1POSS=shirt
'My shirt is green.'

To clarify, however, we mean by NON-VISUAL here *the existence of evidence that is not visual*, rather than *the non-existence of visual evidence*. Visual evidence is not incompatible with the use of *nuk^{w}*, so long as other evidence is present as well.

(3) *Context: I return from vacation and see a bag I left in the back of my fridge. There is also a terrible odour emanating from the fridge.*

ʔes-naq̇ nuk^{w} xeʔ
STAT-rotten SENSE DEM
'Something's gone rotten.'

nuk^{w} also has a wide variety of other uses, beyond "non-visual evidence" narrowly construed; we will catalogue some of these uses in §3.

2.2 *ek^{w}u*: reportative evidence

ek^{w}u is used to report things that the speaker only knows through report or hearsay. This includes direct reports from the person concerned (4), hearsay (5), common knowledge (6), folktales (7), and things you know by reading (such as prices at the store) (8).

(4) tem ek^{w}u teʔ k s=ʕwoẏt=s e Patrick ɬ sitist
NEG REPORT NEG IRR NOM=sleep=3POSS DET Patrick REMOTE night
'Patrick didn't sleep last night [he says].'

(5) mi̓lt kʷ ekʷu ƛ̓uʔ
visit 2SUB REPORT JUST
'They say you are just visiting.' (Thompson and Thompson, 1996, p. 76)

(6) həni ekʷu xeʔe
honey REPORT DEM
'That's called "honey".'

(7) ƛ̓uʔsqayxwʷ ekʷu xeʔ he maʕxetn
person REPORT DEM DET moon
'the moon, they say, was a person' (Thompson and Thompson, 1996, p. 182)

(8) sey ekʷu xeʔ tk snuye e peyeʔ te c̓y̓eh
two REPORT DEM OBL money DET one OBL berry.basket
'Berries are two dollars per basket [it says].'

ekʷu frequently participates in an "evidential doubling" phenomenon. In the ordinary case (4−8), the particle is added to a proposition P to indicate that P is known through report ("According to report, P"). In sentences where P itself expresses the occurence of a report (such as "X says..."), however, the addition of *ekʷu* does not mean that we only know through hearsay that something was said (#"According to report, X said..."); it simply reinforces the *say* predicate. This is true even if *ekʷu* attaches to the matrix rather than the embedded clause:

(9) cut ekʷu e Patrick, n-xwiʔt ws meɬ xeʔ
say REPORT DET Patrick LOC-much 3CONJ FOC DEM
= 'Patrick says that's a lot of money.'
≠ 'From what I hear, Patrick says that's a lot of money.'

nukʷ likewise shows this "evidential doubling", frequently attaching to verbs like *qeʔnim* ("hear") as in (14). This likewise does not seem to mean that the speaker knows through non-visual evidence that they're in a state of hearing something − it appears just to mean that they hear something.

2.3 *nke*: inferential evidence

nke is used in situations where the speaker has only inferential evidence for their claim − that is, when they have deduced it from other pieces of evidence. *nke*, like the inferential evidential in related languages and other Northwest languages (Matthewson et al., 2007; Rullmann et al., 2008; Peterson, 2010), can be used for inferences ranging from deductive certainty ("it must be") to pure conjecture ("it could be, for all I know").

(10) *Context: We are looking at a drawing of a smiling man next to a very large fish.*

x̱zum	neʔ	tek	sqyeytn	ʔes-kʷn-nweṅ-s-t-s	e	ƛ̓uʔsqayxʷ,	
big	PROX	OBL	salmon	STAT-catch-NC-TR-3ERG	DET	man	
ne:m	nke	k	s=y̓e=s	tek	sxʷoxʷ=s		
very	INFER	IRR	NOM=good=3POSS	OBL	heart=3POSS		

'The man caught the great big fish; he must be very happy.'

(11) *Context: The speaker's father usually gets sick when it rains.*

qʷnox̱ʷ	cʔeyɬ	ɬ	n=sqacze,	tekɬ	nke	cʔeyɬ	tek siƛ̓q̓t
sick	now	REMOTE	1POSS=father,	rain	INFER	now	OBL today

'My father is sick, so it must have rained today.'

It is worth noting that *nke* marks the manner in which the conclusion is drawn – by inference – rather than the way in which the premises are known; the premises may be known by visual, sensory, reportative, or any other means. In the case below, the premise is known by sensory means (hearing), but what is relevant to the evidence choice in the conclusion is that this sensory information supports a further inference.

(12)

nɬkʷ	ʕʷyən=s,	teyt	nke	
rumble	stomach=3POSS,	hungry	INFER	

'His stomach is rumbling; he must be hungry.'

3 The many uses of *nukʷ*

nukʷ appears in a wide variety of contexts, including those where the speaker has non-visual sensory evidence, but is by no means limited to such contexts. Nonetheless, for some speakers "non-visuality" may still be the particle's "semantic core"; as one speaker noted, the addition of *nukʷ* "means you can't see it" (Flora Erhardt, p.c.).

3.1 Non-visual evidence

We find *nukʷ* almost always when the speaker reports evidence from hearing, touch, taste, or smell:

3.1.1 Hearing

(13)

snk̓y̓əp	nukʷ	xeʔ
coyote	SENSE	DEM

'It's a coyote [that I hear].'

(14) qeʔnim-ne nukʷ xeʔ e Mr. Strang
hear-1SUB SENSE DEM DET Mr. Strang
'I hear Mr. Strang.'

3.1.2 Touch

(15) ƛ̓ełt nukʷ xeʔ
sticky SENSE DEM
'It's sticky.'

(16) c̓iy nukʷ xeʔ te wul
be.like SENSE DEM OBL wool
'Feels like wool.'

3.1.3 Taste

(17) o, ƛ̓əxt-ẇiy nukʷ
oh, sweet-very SENSE
'Oh, it's very sweet.'

(18) *Context: Speaker has just taken a bite of fish*

cm-s-t-es nukʷ e sqyeytn
burn-CAUSE-TR-3SUB SENSE DET fish
'He burned the fish.'

3.1.4 Smell

(19) splənd nukʷ xeʔ
skunk SENSE DEM
'That's a skunk.'

(20) naq̓ nukʷ xeʔ
rotten SENSE DEM
'It's rotten.'

3.2 Internal states

nukʷ contexts are not, however, limited to "senses" narrowly construed; a wide range of feelings and experiences can be marked with *nukʷ*. For example, *nukʷ* is frequently used when the speaker reports his or her internal states:

(21) teyt kn nukʷ
hungry 1SUB SENSE
'I'm hungry.'

(22) nk̓ex-cin kn nukʷ
dry-mouth 1SUB SENSE
'I'm thirsty.'

(23) qʷnoχ̣ʷ kn nukʷ
sick 1SUB SENSE
'I'm feeling sick.'

(24) χ̣an̓ih kn nukʷ
hurt 1SUB SENSE
'I hurt.'

3.3 Emotional states

nukʷ likewise appears when the speaker is reporting their own emotional states:

(25) zew̓t kn nukʷ
annoy 1SUB SENSE
'I'm annoyed [with someone].'

(26) paqʷuʔ kn nukʷ
afraid 1SUB SENSE
'I'm afraid.'

(27) qʷnoχ̣ʷ nukʷ k n=sxʷoxʷ
sad SENSE IRR 1POSS=heart
'I'm sad.'

(28) maʕ̓t nukʷ k n=sxʷoxʷ
broken SENSE IRR 1POSS=heart
'I'm heartbroken.'

3.4 Suspicions, hunches, and premonitions

The "sensory" aspect of *nukʷ* is not restricted to the five ordinary senses, or physical senses in general; it also applies to other means of knowing such as extra-sensory perception, knowing through dreams, and intuition.

(29) puys-t-xʷ nukʷ səxʷsuxʷs
kill-TRANS-2SUB SENSE grizzly
'[premonition tells me] you've killed a grizzly.' (Thompson and Thompson, 1992, p. 221)

(30) tixʷc̓iy kʷ nukʷ
murder 2SUB SENSE
'I guess you've murdered somebody [said by a blind old woman who sensed crime].' (Thompson and Thompson, 1992, p. 221)

It does not seem necessary for the speaker to even *know* how they know; the sensation of "just knowing" itself seems to be enough:

(31) *Context: The consultant is at the dentist, and has a feeling that something just isn't right about their business.*

te nuk^{w} teʔ c̓iy k s=y̓e=s
NEG SENSE NEG be.like IRR NOM=good=3POSS
'It just didn't seem right.'

3.5 Realization and surprise

Similarly, the experience of coming-to-know appears to be sufficient to license *nuk^{w}*: it is frequently used in cases where the speaker has just realized something or has been surprised.

(32) *Context: The speaker accidentally knocks over her cane.*

k^{w}i-s-t-ene nuk^{w}
fall-CAUSE-TRANS-1SUB SENSE
'Oops, I dropped it.'

(33) *Context: The speaker turns and sees that Patrick has fallen asleep during the elicitation.*

ʕwoy̓t nuk^{w} xeʔ e Patrick
sleep SENSE DEM DET Patrick
'Patrick's fallen asleep.'

(34) qʔaz k^{w} nuk^{w}
tired 2SUB SENSE
'[I just noticed that] you're getting tired.' Thompson and Thompson (1996)

This may explain why *nuk^{w}*, despite its apparent non-visual restriction, can and does appear with visual evidence. For example, (35) is a standard greeting, and contains *nuk^{w}* despite being usually known through visual evidence. Likewise, (36) was clearly gained through visual means in its context of utterance.

(35) ƛ̓ʔex k^{w} nuk^{w}
arrive 2SUB SENSE
'Hello.' (Lit: 'You've arrived.')

(36) *Context: The speaker looks out the window and notices that a sunny day has given way to dark clouds.*

qʷuy̓iʔ nukʷ
cloudy SENSE
'Look, it got cloudy.'

Despite each of (32–36) being known through visual evidence, *nukʷ* is still felicitous; one way to avoid this seeming contradiction is to say that in these cases what *nukʷ* marks is the sensation of coming-to-know, especially when the realization is sudden, unexpected, or surprising.

Speakers differ somewhat in their judgments regarding the appropriateness of *nukʷ* with INFERENCE-FROM-SENSES or INFERENCE-FROM-RESULTS contexts (cf. Peterson, 2009 on Gitksan; Faller, 2010 on Cuzco Quechua; Matthewson, 2011 on St'át'imcets) – those situations in which the speaker has direct evidence not of *P* itself but of a *consequence* of *P*. Some speakers can use *nukʷ* in such contexts (Mandy Jimmie, p.c.), while others prefer the inferential evidential *nke*:

(37) *Context: The speaker sees bear tracks in the woods.*

wʔex nke ʔeɬx̣̓uʔ neʔ k speʔec
be INFER also PROX IRR bear
'Bears are here, too.'

%wʔex nukʷ ʔeɬx̣̓uʔ neʔ k speʔec
be INFER also PROX IRR bear
'Bears are here, too.'

The further removed the sense data is from the proposition asserted, the less acceptable *nukʷ* seems to become; when the sensory data must be combined with other knowledge to support the conclusion, the INFERENCE evidential is used instead. In the following, for example, the proposition can not itself be inferred from the relevant sense data; the smell is one premise in several, and here *nke* is judged more acceptable.

(38) *Context: Hannah's been angling for that job opening at the flower shop, and one day she comes home late smelling of flowers.*

#o, kʷ-nweɬn nukʷ e Hannah tek s=cuw=s wciye w
oh, get-NC SENSE DET Hannah OBL NOM=do=3POSS DIST to
łe sp̓əp̓m-elxʷ
REMOTE flower-house
'Oh, Hannah managed to get a job at the flower shop.'

3.6 Regret, dismay, and negative regard

nukʷ also appears to be used to express negative sentiment towards some-

thing; these uses are not particularly frequent but still worth mentioning. In (39), the speaker is expressing their dismay that it is still only Wednesday; (40) is an exclamation of negative regard about someone.[2]

(39) ċiy wʔex nukʷ ƛ̓uʔ keʔɬes-q̓t
be.like be SENSE JUST three-time
'Alas, it's only Wednesday!'

(40) sqaqx̣a nukʷ
dog SENSE
'That dog!'

nukʷ can also carry with it feelings of embarrassment or even apology (Mandy Jimmie, p.c.); in the following, the speaker is apologizing for breaking up a conversation that had been going well:

(41) ɬep-e-ne nukʷ ƛ̓um qʷincut-m-t-m
forget-TR-1SUB SENSE TEMP speak-MID?-TR-2PL.SUB
'I forget what we were talking about.'

4 Similarities to other evidentials

There is a growing consensus in accounts of the semantics of evidentials regarding some of their semantic and pragmatic properties (Matthewson, 2010, 2011)[3] – in particular, that the evidential contribution of an evidential *projects*, is *not-at-issue*, and resists "that's not true!" denial.

4.1 Projection

One prototypical property of evidentials is that their evidential contribution is some manner of *projected content* such as a presupposition (Izvorski, 1997; Matthewson et al., 2007) or not-at-issue assertion (Murray, 2010) – that unlike ordinary truth-conditional content it is unaffected when it appears in the scope of operations such as negation, modal operators, and similar (Faller, 2002; Matthewson et al., 2007; Matthewson, 2010). Negation is the most straightforward test of projected content: if the statement is negated but the evidential content remains un-negated, then this content projects.

By this test, *nukʷ* patterns like an ordinary evidential; negating a sentence containing *nukʷ* does not negate that a sensory experience is occurring:

(42) ƛ̓əxt nukʷ xeʔ e słaʔx̣ans
sweet SENSE DEM DET food
'The food is sweet.'

[2] *Dog* is a particularly insulting term to use of a human.

[3] This is not to say that there is a consensus as to how to *account* for these properties; there remain various proposals, but most predict of evidentials some of the same properties.

(43) tete? k s=ƛ̓əxt=s nuk^{w} xe? e sła?x̣ans
NEG IRR NOM=sweet=3POSS SENSE DEM DET food
= 'The food is not sweet'
≠ 'I don't have sensory evidence that the food is sweet.'

4.2 Not-at-issueness

Another common feature of evidential content is that it is *not-at-issue* (Roberts et al., 2009) – it cannot itself constitute an answer to the question under discussion (Faller, 2002; Matthewson, 2010). That is to say, although they contribute evidential meanings, evidentials are not used in order to directly answer questions such as "What is your evidence for that?"

In this manner, as well, *nuk^{w}* patterns like other evidentials:

(44) *Context: A is offering a bowl of strawberries to B.*

məsten-te xe?, y̓e xe?
try-IMPER DEM, good DEM
'Try it, it's good.'

then meł?iy e s=xek-s-t-ex^{w} k s=y̓e=s
how FOC DET NOM=know-CAUSE-TRANS-2SUB IRR NOM=good=3POSS
xe?
DEM
'How do you know it's good?'

#y̓e nuk^{w} xe?
good SENSE DEM
'It tastes good.'

Speakers noted that you *can* say this, but doing so is not actually *answering* B's question.

4.3 Resisting direct denial

A final common property of evidentials is that they seem to resist *"that's not true!"* denial (Faller, 2002; Murray, 2010; Matthewson, 2010, 2011).

(45) *Cuzco Quechua* (Faller, 2002)

Ines-qa qaynunchay nana-n-ta-s watuku-sqa.
Ines-TOP yesterday sister-3-ACC-REPORT visit-PAST2
'Ines [reportedly] visited her sister yesterday.'

#Mana-n chiqaq-chu. Mana-n chay-ta willa-rqa-sunki-chu.
not-DIRECT true-NEG. not-DIRECT this-ACC tell-PAST1-3S3O-NEG
'That's not true. You were not told this.'

Whether this is reducible to one of the properties in §4.1-4.2 above, or is in an independent pragmatic property (such as an inability to refer to projected content metalinguistically with demonstratives like "that"), there appears to be something strange about referring to projected or not-at-issue content with "That's not true!" We can see this for both evidential (46) and expressive (47) projected meanings; in each case, "that's not true!" denials only target the *at-issue* meaning.

(46) A: "Apparently there's a chipmunk hiding under the oven!"
B: "That's not true; it's just an old sock!"
B′: #"That's not true; you saw it!"

(47) A: "I hear they hired that honky Scott."
B: "That's not true; they hired Patrick!"
B′: #"That's not true; you like white people!"

We find that *nuk*^{w} fulfills this test as well: when one falsely uses *nuk*^{w} you could still accuse them of deceit (50), but unlike ordinary sentences you cannot quite assert that what they said is *untrue*.

(48) *Context: A is invited to a dinner, and the host B forgets that he is vegetarian and serves him meat. He does not want to cause a fuss, so he secretly feeds it to the dog when no one is looking. When A is asked how he think the meat is, he says:*

nex^{w}m nuk^{w} k s=ẏe=s
true SENSE IRR NOM=good=3POSS
'It's really good!'

(49) #tetesq xesq k s=nex^{w}m=s
NEG DEM IRR NOM=true=3POSS
'That's not true!'

(50) kezesq k^{w} melɬsqiy wsqex, tetesq k s=squpi-n-x^{w}
deceive 2SUB FOC be, NEG IRR NOM=eat-DIR-2SUB
ɬ smic
REMOTE meat
'You're lying; you didn't eat the meat!'

5 Differences from other evidentials

As noted initially, the standard definition of evidentiality (in Aikhenvald, 2004 for example) is one in which an evidential contributes to the discourse that the sentence's content is known through a particular means, be it witness, hearsay, inference, etc. As seen in §3, this captures many (but perhaps not all) uses of *nuk*^{w}.

nuk^{w}, however, has a further restriction, and not one with which we are familiar with in any other evidential: it does not merely require a particular sort

of evidence, but also that the speaker have that evidence *at or near the time of speaking*.

(51) ċłoẋʷ kʷ nukʷ
hot 2SUB SENSE
'You feel hot [I just took hold of you].' (Thompson and Thompson, 1996)

Sensory evidence gained in the distant past, even if had by the speaker, does not appear to be enough to license *nukʷ*; a speaker noted in response to (52) that "It means you're there."

(52) *Context: The speaker is not currently in Russia.*

#ċełcin nukʷ xeʔe n ɬ rusya
cold.weather SENSE DEM LOC REMOTE Russia
'It's cold in Russia.'

The acceptability of using *nukʷ* to describe the recent past seems to be dependent in part on what kind of state is being described; the sentence in (53) was infelicitous with *teyt* ("hungry"), but its counterpart with *qʷnoẋʷ* ("sick") in (54) was acceptable.

(53) #teyt kn nukʷ xeʔe ɬ s=ʕap
hungry 1SUB SENSE DEM REMOTE NOM=dark
Intended: 'I was hungry last night.'

(54) qʷnoẋʷ kn nukʷ xeʔe ɬ s=ʕap
sick 1SUB SENSE DEM REMOTE NOM=dark
'I was sick last night.'

Since a similar judgment occurred with (55) – it was acceptable to use this even if the skunk was sensed an hour beforehand – it seems plausible that the relevant difference is whether the sensory experience lingers after the initial experience.

(55) spləɴd nukʷ xeʔ
skunk SENSE DEM
'There is/was a skunk.'

It likewise fails to appear when describing generalities or traits; for example, it appears when describing a current experience of fear (56), but not when describing one's phobias (57):

(56) paqʷuʔ kn nukʷ
afraid 1SUB SENSE
'I'm afraid.'

(57) paqʷuʔ-sm-ne (#nukʷ) xeʔ e sneyiʔ
afraid-1OBJ-1SUB (SENSE) DEM DET ghost
'I'm afraid of ghosts.'

It is also required that the *speaker* have this evidence:

(58) *cut e Cameron k s=qəmqəmt=s nukʷ
say DET Cameron IRR NOM=warm=3POSS SENSE
Intended: 'Cameron says it feels warm.'

(59) *ƛ̓əxt nukʷ xeʔ e leməns cut xeʔ e Patrick
sweet SENSE DEM DET lemons say DEM DET Patrick
Intended: 'Lemons taste sweet to Patrick.'

Unlike the Nłeʔkepmxcín reportative and inferential evidentials, as well as evidentials in other languages such as Quechua (Faller, 2002), the source of evidence resists "shifting" or "coercion" to another person, even in questions, or under verbs of saying (58–59).

Although evidentials in questions perform a variety of functions (Faller, 2006; Littell, 2010; Murray, 2010), it is a frequently-reported property of evidentials that, in questions, the relevant source of evidence is the addressee rather than the speaker (Floyd, 1996; Faller, 2002; Aikhenvald, 2004). That is, evidentials in assertions encode the speaker's source of evidence, but evidentials in questions indicate what source of evidence the speaker thinks the *addressee* will use.

(60) *Wanka Quechua* (Floyd, 1996)

imay-mi wankayuu-pi kuti-mu-la
when-DIRECT Huancayo-ABL return-AFAR-PAST
'When did he come back from Huancayo?'
(implies that the addressee has directly acquired information about the event)

(61) *Cuzco Quechua* (Faller, 2002)

pi-ta-s Ines-qa watuku-sqa
who-ACC-REPORT Ines-TOP visit-PAST2
'Who did Ines visit?'
(speaker expects hearer to have reportative evidence for his or her answer)

We see below the same phenomenon illustrated for the Nłeʔkepmxcín reportative *ekʷu*:

(62) c̓ełt ekʷu e qʷoʔ
cold REPORT DET water
'The water is cold [according to what I've heard].'

(63) ke ʔ ek^{w}u k s=c̓eɬt=s e q^{w}oʔ
whether REPORT IRR NOM=cold=3POSS DET water
'Is the water cold [according to what you've heard]?'

nuk^{w}, however, appears to be infelicitous in all questions. If, like other evidentials, *nuk^{w}* contributed to a question an implication that the addressee would answer based on sensory evidence, it would be possible (and expected) in questions like (64–65):

(64) ke ʔ (*nuk^{w}) k eʔ=s=teyt
whether SENSE IRR 2POSS=NOM=hungry
'Do you feel hungry?'

(65) ke ʔ (*nuk^{w}) xeʔ k s=c̓lox̣^{w}=s
whether SENSE DEM IRR NOM=hot=3POSS
'Does it [the tea] feel hot?'

Indeed, *nuk^{w}* fails to appear in any queries about senses, internal states, or emotions, even with those predicates (like *teyt*) with which, in 1st person assertions, it is nearly obligatory. This is a significant departure from the behaviour of other evidentials in questions, and one of our first reasons for considering that perhaps *nuk^{w}* is contributing its evidential meaning in a manner different from other evidentials.

A third way in which *nuk^{w}* acts anomalously, when compared to other evidentials, regards the content of sentences it attaches to. Other evidentials, in Nɬeʔkepmxcín and in other languages, invoke their particular type of evidence to support some other claim. We can see this in (4–12), or even with English evidential-like adverbials such as "apparently" or "reportedly".

Sentences with *nuk^{w}*, on the other hand, are frequently just descriptions of the sensation itself – that the speaker is hungry, sad, etc. The information that the speaker knows these things by sensory experience is not evidence used to support some other claim – indeed, the addition of *nuk^{w}* to "I am hungry" or "I am sad" does not really seem to add any information that is not already present. Rather, many of these uses of *nuk^{w}* seem instead to *express* something – be it hunger, sadness, regret, regard, or surprise – which leads us to propose that *nuk^{w}* is primarily and *expressive* along the lines of *ouch*, *oops*, *alas*, and *wow*.

6 Expressive evidentiality

The more instances we collected of *nuk^{w}*, the more stretched the semantic core of "sensory evidence" became. Since we had begun with the assumption that *nuk^{w}* was essentially evidential, much of our earliest investigations focused on this use. In time, however, the apparently non-evidential uses of *nuk^{w}* became more pronounced, and in natural, spontaneous speech most of the uses of *nuk^{w}* we gathered were of the non-evidential type.

When considered in the following order – the order in which we investigated these meanings, and the order in which we have presented this paper – these contexts could perhaps be considered to be "basically sensory evidential", with the exceptions being perhaps peripheral semantic extensions of "sensory".

(66) a. Evidence from hearing, touch, taste, and smell
b. Internal states
c. Emotional states
d. Having-a-feeling, hunches, and premonitions
e. Realization and surprise
f. Regret, dismay, and negative regard

However, this order is in part a historical accident – that the evidential uses of *nuk*^{w} were those first described (Thompson and Thompson, 1992, 1996), and our own more intense scrutiny of the particle began as part of a larger cross-linguistic project on evidentiality (Waldie et al., 2009; Littell et al., 2009). If the uses of *nuk*^{w}, however, are elaborated in any other order (such as that in 67), it becomes equally plausible that *nuk*^{w} is more about expressing-a-feeling than providing-evidence.

(67) a. Emotional states
b. Realization and surprise
c. Regret, dismay, and negative regard
d. Internal states
e. Evidence from hearing, touch, taste, and smell
f. Having-a-feeling, hunches, and premonitions

Likewise, treating *nuk*^{w} as an evidential does predict some of its behaviour – that it is projective, *not-at-issue*, and resists "that's not true!" denial – but other of its semantic properties are unexplained, such as its restriction to present states and evidence had by the first person. It would be possible, of course, to simply add "...and the evidence is had at the moment by the speaker" to a more standardly evidential denotation for *nuk*^{w}, but we will instead suggest that another type of projective *not-at-issue* content can handle all of these properties.

We propose that the idea of *expressive content* (Kaplan, 1999; Potts, 2005; Schlenker, 2007) best captures the overall use-conditions of *nuk*^{w}: that it is among a class of expressions that speakers use to communicate their current inner state. English has a number of these expressions, many but not all of them exclamatory particles; this list includes but is not limited to:

(68) *oops*: the speaker is witnessing a minor mishap
ouch: the speaker is experiencing pain
alas: the speaker is experiencing regret
wow: the speaker is experiencing amazement
damn: the speaker is experiencing negative feelings

Expressions such as these have all the required semantic properties above: they are projective, *not-at-issue*, resist "that's not true!" denial, and are mostly restricted to the speaker's own present states.[4] We can note, in particular, the difficulty in "shifting" their point-of-view away from the speaker. When put into questions, for example, they do not show the "flip" expected of other point-of-view expressions like evidentials, modals or "seems" (Faller, 2002; Speas and Tenny, 2003; Littell et al., 2009), even though they are in questions, "Have you heard that Jane, alas, is seeing someone?" and "Where are my damn keys?" still express the emotional state of the speaker.

Our proposal is that *nukʷ* does not, as other evidentials do, have as its primary contribution "...according to *X* kind of evidence" for some type of evidence *X*. Instead, *nukʷ* is an expressive particle, expressing something like "the speaker is being affected by a stimulus". This, of course, is a very broad use-condition, but *nukʷ* is used in a very wide variety of conditions – nearly the union of all the contexts of the English expressives in (68), and then some.[5] Overall, it has a similar set of use-conditions to English "Oh!": that the speaker is, simply, experiencing something.

This is made more plausible by its likely historical origin: used as a sentential predicate, *ʔes-nukʷ* (with the progressive prefix *ʔes-*) means "affected, upset by some event, frightened, startled" (Thompson and Thompson, 1996, p. 1265). We believe this is a very likely source for the expressive use of *nukʷ*, although as an expressive particle *nukʷ* is not currently restricted to negative, frightening, or surprising feelings.[6] The sensory evidential use of *nukʷ* would then be a semantic expansion of this "being affected" meaning, rather than the other way around.

While a more traditionally evidential account of *nukʷ* cannot easily account for many of its semantic properties, an expressive account does; it is no longer mysterious, for example, that *nukʷ* be restricted to the speaker's momentary states and feelings. In particular, this can explain the infelicity of *nukʷ* in questions about the addressee's inner state – questions in which, if *nukʷ* were a "true" evidential – we would expect it. If *nukʷ* primarily expresses that the speaker is being affected by an experience, it simply would not make much sense in questions asking about the *addressee's* inner state. In a question like (69), the speaker would be simultaneously asking whether a state is true *and* expressing that they

[4] It is certainly true that expressions like "oops", "ouch", and "alas" can be used regarding past events, and events involving other people, but in these cases there should be, in order to be a *sincere* use of the expression, the relevant feeling to some degree in the speaker at the moment of utterance. Frequently "ouch" is used sympathetically in reference to another's pain, and "alas" regarding past events, but for it to be a sincere use it seems there ought to be in the speaker some degree of empathy with the one in pain or a lingering sense of regret.

One can also, of course, use any of these terms in jest or sarcastically, but these are not *sincere* uses (Kaplan, 1999).

[5] We can note in support of this that Nłeʔkepmxcín appears to lack words like "oops" and "ouch" altogether; when asked to translate these, speakers usually use a sentence containing *nukʷ* instead (32,24).

[6] It is, however, somewhat biased towards the negative; it occurs to report sadness but not, to our knowledge, with happiness, and while it sometimes occurs in contexts of negative or pejorative regard we have no instances of its use for positive or honorific regard.

are experiencing it.

(69) *keʔ nuk^{w} k eʔ=s=teyt
whether SENSE IRR 2POSS=NOM=hungry
Intended: 'Do you feel hungry?'

After several attempts at trying to translate just how awkward sentences like these are (along the lines of "I know that are you hungry?" and "You're very fine to yourself that you are, that somebody else is thirsty"), one speaker offered "It's like you're asking a question with an answer, or answering with a question."

7 Conclusions

7.1 Is *nuk^{w}* still an evidential?

These facts necessitate raising the question, "Is *nuk^{w}* an *evidential* at all?" After all, in its semantics and pragmatics it behaves more like "ouch" than "apparently", and if we want to preserve a theory in which all evidentials are of a uniform semantic implementation (Matthewson, 2010), it may be better to treat *nuk^{w}* as not being an evidential at all.

Nonetheless there are reasons to consider *nuk^{w}* as still being an evidential. Even though it has a variety of uses, in many uses it does contribute evidential meanings, and this use is, if not the most frequent, a very salient use both to speakers ("It means you can't see it") and researchers (Thompson and Thompson, 1992). Moreover, it remains a participant in the overall Nłeʔkepmxcín evidential paradigm. It occurs in same syntactic position as the other evidentials, is in complementary distribution with them, and even seems to participate in the sort of "evidential implicatures" that we expect from an evidential: that the use of *nuk^{w}* implicates that other types of evidence (visual, reportative, etc.) are unavailable or not relevant.

Instead of categorizing *ek^{w}u* and *nke* as "true" evidentials and *nuk^{w}* as a non-evidential, we would instead like to note that there is a some degree of overlap between expressive and evidential meanings, in the same way that there is overlap between evidential and modal meanings. We propose therefore that *nuk^{w}* is a *expessive evidential* (or perhaps "evidential expressive") – an expressive that performs (among other things) an evidential function. *nke*, on the other hand, appears to be more straightforwardly modal – it seems directly parallel to the (possibly cognate) St'át'imcets *k'a* (Matthewson, 2008) – suggesting that within a single language evidential functions may be distributed among different sorts of semantic objects.

7.2 The heterogeneity of evidentials

It is a frequent assumption in investigations of evidentials that elements that form a paradigm have the same type of semantic implementation: that in a particular language evidentials are, as a class, homogeneous: that they are all modals,

or illocutionary operators, or some other type of operator (Faller, 2002; Matthewson et al., 2007; Murray, 2010). Peterson (2010) argues, contrary to this trend, that within a single language different evidentials may have very different semantic implementations, specifically that some may be modals while others are illocutionary operators.

Nłeʔkepmxcín illustrates this point in a striking fashion. The Gitksan evidentials as described in Peterson (2010) are of various syntactic realizations; in particular, the root *n̓akw* has both a different syntactic implementation and different semantic properties than the other Gitksan evidentials. Although these evidentials form a "pragmatic" paradigm they do not form a single syntactic paradigm; we could still argue that within a single syntactic paradigm all evidentials of a uniform semantic type.

In Nłeʔkepmxcín, on the other hand, *nuk*^{w}, *ek*^{w}*u*, and *nke* appear to have the same syntactic implementation, but as seen above can vary significantly in their semantics and pragmatics. Even if we do not adopt an "expressive" account of *nuk*^{w}, it nonetheless differs in important and unexpected ways from the other evidentials. Regardless of a particular theoretical stance towards or implementation of *nuk*^{w}, this highlights the importance, when investigating evidentials in a language, of treating each evidential separately; that just because an element behaves like others in many ways does not mean that it does not exhibit significant and interesting differences in other ways.

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